Abstract-For conventional secret sharing, if cheaters can submit possibly forged shares after observing shares of the honest users in the reconstruction phase, they can disturb the protocol and only they can reconstruct the true secret. To overcome the problem, secret sharing scheme with properties of cheater-identification have been proposed. Existing protocols for cheater-identifiable secret sharing assumed non-rushing cheaters or honest majority. In this paper, using message authentication, we remove both conditions simultaneously, and give its universal construction from any secret sharing scheme. To resolve this end, we explicitly propose the concepts of "individual identification" and "agreed identification". For both settings, we provide protocols for cheater-identifiable secret sharing. In our protocols, the security parameter can be set independently of the share size and the underlying finite field size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a basic primitive for secure information transmission [21] . It involves a dealer who has a secret S in the secret space S and a set of players. The dealer divides the secret S into n shares and distributes the shares to n players such that if a set of players is qualified then all the players in the set can reconstruct the secret and if the set of players is not qualified then any player in the set cannot obtain any information about the secret. In case of (k, n)-threshold scheme, any set of k players can be qualified. Generally, a family A of subsets of {1, . . . , n} forms the access structure of a secret sharing protocol when any subsets in A can reconstruct the secret S and others can learn nothing about it. It is known that when a family A of subsets is closed with respect to the union, there exists a secret sharing protocol whose access structure is A [11] , [3] , [12] , [13] , [4] , [5] . Further, when a non-qualified set of players obtains a part of information, these schemes are called non-perfect. If a non-perfect scheme has certain threshold properties, then it is called ramp scheme [2] , [25] , [7] .
For conventional secret sharing protocols, it is assumed that every applicant is honest or semi-honest, where a player wishing to open the secret is called an applicant. However, in a real scenario, some applicants may maliciously behave in the execution of the protocol. In particular, a part of players may submit incorrect shares so as to yield an incorrect secret in the reconstruction phase. To overcome the problem, additional properties to conventional secret sharing have been considered and new schemes such as cheater-detectable secret sharing (CDSS) [22] and cheater-identifiable secret sharing (CISS) [18] have been proposed. Here, a player that submits incorrect shares is called a cheater. A protocol is called a (t, )-cheaterdetectable secret sharing (CDSS) when it detects the existence of cheaters among applicants with probability 1 − at least under the condition that the number of cheaters is not greater than t. A protocol is called a (t, )-cheater-identifiable secret sharing (CISS) when it identifies who submitted incorrect shares with probability 1 − at least under the condition that the number of cheaters is not greater than t.
However, cheaters may submit their shares incorrectly after observing shares of honest players. Such cheaters is called rushing cheaters. The papers [20] , [23] , [24] , [1] proposed CISS protocols to properly work against such rushing cheaters. To achieve this task, their sharing phase is composed of two rounds. Unfortunately, these protocols cannot identify the cheaters when the number of cheaters is more than the half of applicants. In this situation, only the protocol in [1] can detect the existence of cheaters without identifying them. Ishai et al [10] proposed another CISS protocol identifying them even when the number of cheaters is more than the half of applicants. To achieve this task, they propose a locallyidentifiable secret sharing (LISS), in which a server identifies the cheaters instead of each player, but their LISS is not robust against rushing cheaters. In their protocol, the players submit their shares to the server, and the server recovers the secret and identifies the cheaters for each player. While the server sends each player an information to identify the cheaters, this information depends on the player. That is, this information is correct only when the player is honest. Hence, their identifications do not agree in this protocol.
In a real scenario, it is not easy to prepare the server. Therefore, it is strongly required to propose a protocol to identify the rushing cheaters even when the number of cheaters [20] , [23] , [24] t
n is the number of the players. n is the number of the applicants. t is the number of the cheaters. k is the number of qualified players. 1 − 2 − is the successful probability to identify the cheaters. Efficiency shows the computational complexity of the protocol. Flexibility is the independence of the choice of the security parameter from the secret size or the form of original protocol. Number of Rounds shows the number of rounds in the sharing phase.
is more than the half of applicants. In this paper, to resolve this problem, we explicitly propose the concepts of "individual identification" and "agreed identification". A CISS protocol with individual identification privately identifies the cheaters so that the identification depends on individual players. A CISS protocol with agreed identification commonly identifies the cheaters so that the identification is independent of the player. The difference between these two types of protocols is based on whether their identifications agree or not. The protocol in [10] belongs to the former, and the protocols in [20] , [23] , [24] , [1] do to the latter. However, we do not need to distinguish CDSS protocols in this way because "individual detection" of the existence of the cheaters cannot improve "agreed detection". We propose a CISS protocol with individual identification as well as a CISS protocol with agreed identification. Both protocols well work even with rushing cheaters, and the latter is composed of two rounds as well as the protocol in [1] . The former can identify the cheaters even when the number of cheaters is more than the half of applicants. The latter can detect the existence of the cheaters under the same situation, but can identify the cheaters only when the number of cheaters is less than the half of applicants. This performance is the same as the protocol given in [1] .
Next, we discuss the construction of protocols. Algebraic structures underlie many CISS protocols [20] , [23] , [24] , [1] as in the original construction by Shamir. They are limited to (k, n)-threshold scheme protocols. Also, many efficient secret sharing protocols were proposed without use of algebraic structures when the size of secret is large [25] , [12] . Protocols with general access structure were constructed [11] , [3] , [12] . Also, ramp scheme secret sharing protocols were constructed [2] , [25] . Such general secret sharing protocols were not used to in these CISS protocols. Hence, it is desired to construct a CISS protocol by converting an existing secret sharing protocol. Such a construction is called a universal construction. The protocol in [10] is universal in this sense. But, it was constructed by converting an existing secret sharing protocol only when the share is given as an element of a finite field. So, to make the scheme more secure, it needs a finite field of larger size.
In this paper, we distinguish an applicant from a qualified player because a cheater is always an applicant while some of existing studies [1] , [20] , [23] , [24] assume that they are identical. Hence, the protocol needs to work well when the set of applicants is larger than the set of qualified players. To satisfy this requirement, we characterize qualified players by general access structure, and universally construct our protocols from an existing arbitrary secret sharing protocol with general access structure when the share is given as an element of vector space of a finite field. Our universal construction of CISS for both settings employs the method of the message authentication based on universal-2 hash function [14] , [17] . That is, we attach the message authentication [14] , [17] to the share of the existing secret sharing protocol. Then, the identification can be realized by checking whether the share is original. Hence, our construction does not require a finite field of large size.
From a practical viewpoint, we need to care about the computational complexity of the protocol. A protocol is efficient when its computational complexity is not so large. When the players identify the cheaters with probability 1 − 2 − , the computational complexity of the protocols given in [1] is O( log ). When the protocol is universally constructed, the total computational complexity depends on the original secret sharing protocol. In this case, we focus on computational complexity except for the part of the original protocol. In this sense, the protocol in [10] is O( log ), and our protocol is also O( log ).
However, in general, the security parameter may depend on the other parameters for the protocols. In the protocols in [20] , [23] , [24] , the security parameter depends on the size of secret. Hence, it is desired to flexibly choose the security parameter . We say that a protocol is flexible, when the security parameter can be set independently of the secret size. Flexibility provides the power of partial customization of length of random strings, according to the requirement. The protocol in [1] can flexibly choose the security parameter by adjusting the finite field with prime size. Also, the protocol in [10] can flexibly choose the security parameter by adjusting the finite field appearing in the original protocol. Although these protocols offer the flexibility, the security parameter depends on the size of the finite field. The above computational complexity O( log ) can be realized by suitable choices of the size of the finite field in these protocols [9] . Hence, the choice of the security parameter has a certain restriction
Fortunately, our protocol works with any finite field, and the security parameter can be freely chosen independently of the size of the finite field and the secret size. Therefore, our protocol is completely flexible and works even with finite field F 2 , which simplifies the realization. Overall, the comparison of the performances of existing protocols with ours is summarized as Table I .
The remaining part of this paper is as follows. Section II gives our CISS protocol for individual identification. Section III shows its security. Section IV gives our CISS protocols for agreed identification and detection. Section V compares the overhead of ours with those of existing protocols. More rigorous discussion is available in [26] .
II. PROTOCOL FOR INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION
Let n be the number of players and be the security parameter, which is independent of the structure of the original secret sharing protocol. We will construct our protocol so that the verifier identifies the cheater with probability more than 1 − q − . While our construction is given by attaching the message authentication protocol [14] , [17] to the share of an existing secret sharing protocol like [20] , it works with an arbitrary existing secret sharing protocol.
Let (Sh, Rc) be a secret sharing protocol realizing access structure A with Sh : S → V n , where V is an m-dimensional vector space F m q over a finite filed F q . Here, the access structure A expresses the condition for a subset of {1, . . . , n} to recover the secret S ∈ S. To present our CISS protocol for individual identification based on the protocol (Sh, Rc), we make preparation as follows. We employ message authentication based on Toeplitz matricies, which are often used in cryptography (e.g., hard-core functions [8] and universal hash functions [14] , [15] ). In fact, it is possible to extend our protocol by using a generic message authentication. Since the overhead depends on the choice of the message authentication, we present a protocol based on Toeplitz matricies for overhead analysis. For a secret S ∈ S, we denote the projection of Sh(S) onto the i-th coodinate by Sh i (S). Then, we define the random number X i := Sh i (S) as the share of the i-th player, which is sent by the dealer. For i = j, the dealer independently generates n(n − 1) random numbers Z j,i taking values in F q . Also, the dealer independently generates × m Toeplitz matrix T j . Then, the dealer calculates the random number Y j,i := T j X i + Z j,i . Now, we give our CISS protocol for individual identification as Protocol 1. Due to the construction of Protocol 1, we find that its computational complexity is O( log ).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As our security analysis, we show the following theorem. Theorem 1: Let n be the number of applicants. Protocol 1 is an (n − 1, q − )-CISS protocol for individual identification realizing access structure A with secret space S and share space S i = F (2n−1) +2m−1 q . Further, if the set of honest Protocol 1 CISS protocol for individual identification STEP 1: [Dealing] For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the dealer sends the j-th player the publishable information (X j , Z 1,j , . . . , Z j−1,j , Z j+1,j . . . , Z n,j ) and the identification-information
[Sharing] The applicants send their publishable information as follows. The i-th player sends (X i , Z j,i ) to the j-th player. STEP 3:
[Identification] The j-th player checks whether the relation
holds, where the information received from the i-th player is (X i , Z j,i ), which is the same process as the verification of the message authentication [14] , [17] . STEP 4: [Reconstruction] If the set of the players verified by the j-th player to be honest satisfies the access structure A, the j-th player reconstructs the secret from the collection of X i of players verified to be honest.
players satisfies the access structure A. Each player can reconstruct the secret S ∈ S. Proof: Since the function (X i , Z j,i ) → T j X i + Z j,i is a universal-2 hash function with the randomly chosen Toeplitz matrix T j , the relation (1) holds with probability smaller than q − if the j-th player makes a cheat. Therefore, even though all of players except for the i-th player cheat even with collusion, the i-th player can identify who cheats with high probability as Fig. 1 .
Also, even though several players collude together, they cannot obtain any information for the shares by other players as follows. To see this fact, we assume that the j 1 -th player, the j 2 -th player, ..., the j a -th player collude together. We focus on the information on X i shared by the i-th player. Since Z j,i is independent and uniform, Y j1,i , Y j2,i , . . . , Y ja,i are independent of T j1 X i , T j1 X i , . . . , T ja X i . Since they obtain no information for T j1 X i , T j1 X i , . . . , T ja X i , they obtain no information on X i .
Thus, if the original protocol with shares X i works as secret sharing well, our protocol also works as secret sharing well at least with probability 1 − q − . Therefore, we obtain the desired statement.
IV. PROTOCOL FOR AGREED IDENTIFICATION
Now, we can give our CISS protocol for agreed identification as Protocol 2.
Since the majority voting of the results of respective individual verifications identifies (as shown in Theorem 1) who cheats if more than half of the players wishing the reconstruction are honest, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let n be the number of applicants. Protocol 2 is a ( (n −1)/2 , q − )-CISS protocol realizing access structure A with secret space S and share space S i = F CISS for Individual Identification P 1 identifies P 2 and P 3 as cheaters.
CDSS
They consider there exists at least one cheater.
CISS for Agreed Identification
They identify P 1 as cheater if P 2 and P 3 collude together. Protocol 2 CISS protocol for agreed identification STEP 1: [Dealing] For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the dealer sends the j-th player the publishable information (X j , Z 1,j , . . . , Z j−1,j , Z j+1,j . . . , Z n,j ) and the identification-information If there exists a player who individually identifies at least one cheater, we consider that there exists a cheater. So, Protocol 2 detects the existence of the cheaters with probability 1 − q −l as Fig. 1 , which yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
Let n be the number of applicants. Assume that when a subset of {1, . . . , n} contains n elements, it satisfies the access structure A. Protocol 3 is an (n − 1, q − )-CDSS protocol realizing access structure A with secret space S and share space S i = F (2n−1) +2m−1 q . Further, if there is no cheater, the players agreedly reconstruct the secret S ∈ S. Now, we consider the case when more than half players collude together. We assume that only the j 0 -th player is honest and that the majority cheaters (the j 1 -th player, ..., the j a -th player) collude together. The cheater, the j v -th player rewrites T jv , Z jv,jw and Y jv,jw for 1 ≤ v ≤ a, 0 ≤ w ≤ a so that Y jv,jw = T jv X jw + Z jv,jw for 1 ≤ w ≤ a and Y jv,j0 = T jv X j0 + Z jv,j0 . Due to the majority voting, the agreed identification is that the honest player, the j 0 -th player is a cheater. Therefore, when the majority cheat, the identification of our CISS protocol for agreed identification is incorrect while our CDSS protocol detects the existence of a cheater and the identification of our CISS protocol for individual identification is correct, as Fig. 1 .
V. COMPARISON OF OVERHEAD
First, we compare the overhead of the protocol in [10] with ours. Let u be the size of the share of the original secret sharing protocol. Theorem 4 of [10] guarantees the success probability is 1 − 2 − when 2 − > n 2 (n + 1)(u − 1)
and the size of the share of their CISS protocol is u 4n+2 . That is, their overhead is u 4n+1 . Since u > n 2 (n + 1)2 , their overhead is greater than (n 2 (n + 1)) 4n+1 2 (4n+1) . In our case, we have u = q m and 2 − = q − . Hence, our overhead is
m . Now, we consider the case with m = 1 because Theorem 4 of [10] considers only this case. Then, our overhead is 2 (2n−1) . Therefore, the their exponential coefficient with respect to the security parameter is twice as ours. Next, we compare the overhead of the protocol in [1] with ours. Since their protocol is specified to the (k, n)-threshold scheme, we translate our overhead to the (k, n)-threshold scheme. When the secret size is |S|, the conventional (k, n)-threshold scheme has share size |S|p(n) for some polynomial p. When we construct our CISS protocol based on this secret sharing protocol, the share size is |S|p(n)2 (2n−1) q m−1 . That
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is, its exponential coefficient with respect to the security parameter is still (2n − 1). In contrast, the ( k/2 , 2 − )-CISS protocol in [1] has share size (n − k/2 ) n+k 2 (n+k) . See Table 2 of [1] with = 2 − and t = k/2 . That is, its exponential coefficient with respect to the security parameter is n + k. So, when k is close to n, these two overheads are almost the same.
VI. DISCUSSION
Firstly, as our proposal, we have explicitly distinguished CISS protocols for individual identification from CISS protocols for agreed identification. Then, attaching a message authentication protocol to any existing secret sharing protocol, we have universally constructed CISS protocols for individual identification and agreed identification as well as a CDSS protocol. Our CISS protocol for individual identification and our CDSS protocol well work even when the number of cheaters is more than the half of applicants. Our CISS protocol for agreed well works when less than half of the applicants are cheaters. Our protocols have computational complexity O( log ) when the probability of successfully identifying (detecting) the cheaters is 1 − 2 − . We can freely choose the security parameter independently of the secret size and share size of the original secret sharing protocol. Also, we do not use huge finite fields. That is, we can realize any security parameter even with the finite field F 2 . These characteristics simplify the realization. We have checked that the overhead of our protocols are not so huge in comparison with existing protocols. Indeed, although our protocol has been given as a simple combination of a message authentication [14] , [17] and an existing secret sharing, the proposed protocol achieves performances that had not been realized in existing protocols (See Table 1 ). In this paper, we have employed message authentication based on Toeplitz matrix for simple performance analysis. We can generalize our method with a general message authentication protocol, which requires more complicated performance analysis.
